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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THELMA MADSEN, and DIANA 
LYNN MADSEN, an infant, by 
Thelma Madsen, her parent 
and natural guardian, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STATE 
BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, SAMUEL 
H. SMITH, LEON HATCH, TAGE 
SPONBECK and DOE I THROUGH 
DOE V, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 233142 J-:),_-)j 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the wife and infant child of 
Thomas Madsen for his wrongful death. The Plaintiffs-
Appellants claim that the Defendants-Respondents were 
negligent in their actions tm.;ard Thomas Madsen, thereby 
causing his death. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted Defendants' motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claim was barred 
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek to have the order dismissing 
Plaintiffs' complaint reversed and the case remanded to the 
-1-
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to the lower court for trial. 
STATKMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March l, 1974 Thomas B. Ma~sen was an inmate, 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison at the point of the 
mountain. During some months prior to that date, Mr. Madsen 
had been repeatedly approached by prison officials and 
encouraged to undergo plastic surgery for a facial lift 
at the prison hospital. After numerous requests Mr. ~adsen 
had consented to that operation which was performed on the 
morning of March 1, 1974. Prior to the operation Mr. Madsen 
was given a shot of morphine, and he received another morphir 
shot following the operation. For some time Mr. Madsen had 
suffered from a heart ailment which fact was known or 
reason~bly could and should have been know to the prison 
officials. 
After the operation, Mr. Madsen was placed in a 
hospital room to recover from the effects of the anesthesia 
and surgery. At approximately 6:00 or 6:30p.m. of that d~ 
Mr. Madsen was discovered by another inmate by the name of 
Ron Bergeron to be having trouble breathing. Mr. Bergeron 
then went to the prison hospital medical technician and 
advised him that Mr. Madsen was having difficulty breathing 
and suggested that Mr. ~adsen may need to go by way of 
ambulance to the University of Utah Medical Center for medico 
treatment. The medical technician, whose name is at this tir 
unknown to appellants, responded that there was nothing wronc 
with Mr. Madsen that in fact, Mr. Ma~sen was a hypochondriac. 
-2-
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Approximately one hour later, another inmate working at 
the prison hospital at that time by the name of Thomas 
Brough observed Mr. Madsen to be having difficulty breathing 
to a critical extent. Mr. Brough then notified the prison 
medical technician, apparently, the same individual, that 
Mr. Madsen appeared to be in great difficulty and perhaps 
was dying. Approximately five minutes later between 7:30 
and 8:00 p.m. the medical technician examined Mr. Madsen 
and then summoned an ambulance and notified the prison 
doctor. The technician also attempted to give Mr. Madsen 
oxygen. However, the oxygen tanks apparently were not 
functioning and would not fit through the door to where 
Mr. Madsen was. Approximately forty five minutes later 
the ambulance arrived and transported Mr. Madsen to the 
University of Utah Medical Center where he was pronounced 
dead on arrival. 
An autopsy was later performed on the body of 
Thomas Madsen and the findings were basically that Thomas 
Madsen had suffered a heart attack while at the prison 
hospital facility and that the heart attack was the direct 
cause of death. 
-3-
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l\RGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL II1MUNITY ACT IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AS A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIT~D 
STATES AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, THEREFORE, 
THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING IT Il'J THE PRESENT CASE. 
A. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 63-30-10 (10) IS UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LA\"1 UNDER 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND ARTICLE I, §24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
In order for a legislatively-enacted statute to meet 
the Constitutional test for validity, it is required that it 
apply to all persons within the class with which it seeks ~ 
deal equally, both upon the face of the statute itself and in 
application. 
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of the Stati 
of Utah also incorporates such premise: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
It is Appellants' contention that Section 63-30-10(10: 
Utah Code .I\J1notated, fails to meet those specified Constituti 
requirements. Section 63-30-10 (10) denies an action against 
the State by one who has suffered an injury as a result of ~ 
"incarceration". As a matter of application and operation~ 
the present case, one injured in a prison hospital will be 
denied his claim, although, if he had been injured in any 
other government operated hospital in the State, he would ha'. 
~4-
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been allowed access to the courts to prosecute his cla~m. 
Such is true though the functions and the risks inherent in 
the operation of both of the hospitals are the same. The 
result is a denial of equal protection of the law and a non-
uniform operation of this law. 
While Appellants concede that those incarcerated in 
a state prison have more limited rights than those who are 
not, one right must remain inviolate, even to prisoners, in 
the absence of a court-ordered execution--the right to life. 
That right is fundamental and guaranteed to all, whether 
incarcerated or not. In regards to application of the equal 
protection clause of the United States Constitution, the u. S. 
Supreme Court has adopted a rigorous policy of "strict scrutiny" 
in cases dealing with the restriction of a "fundamental right". 
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 282 Fed. Supp. 70 (E.D. 
N. Y. 1969). Such scrutiny must then be applied to the pre-
sent case. 
This Court has also established standards by which a 
legislative act should be judged when it applies unequally to 
persons in the same circumstances: 
... to be unconstitutional the discrimination 
must be unreasonable or arbitrary. A classification 
is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion 
or exclusion features so long as there is some basis 
for the differentiation between classes or subject 
matters included as compared to those excluded from 
its operation, provided the differentiation bears.a 
reasonable relation to the purposes to be accompl1shed 
by the act. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 70 P. 2d, 
923 (1938). 
..:s-
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The classification must bear a reasonable relation 
to the purposes to be accomplished by the act. The object or 
purpose of the act is the touchstone for determining whether 
the act is constitutional or unconstitutional. §_~ate v.~ 
The same test is employed by the United States Suprec at 507. 
Court in determining a violation of the Equal Protection Clauo 
of the Fourteenth Amendment when a suspect classification is 
not involved. "A Century of Supreme Court adjudication under 
the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the appli-
cation of the traditional standard of review, which requires 
that the State's system be shown to bear some rational rela-
tionship to legitimate state purposes." San Antonio Indepen~ 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 
L. Ed. 2d 56 (1973). 
The Supreme Court of Kansas recently applied these tes· 
to the Kansas Governmental Irnrnuni ty Act Brown v. Hi chi ta State 
University, 217 Kan. 279, 540 P. 2d. 66 (1975). 
"As the guardian of the principles embodied 
in the Constitutions, it is within our inherent power, 
and our duty, to determine the constitutionality of 
the legislation in question." Brown at 80. 
The Kansas Court then went on to strike down the class: 
fication created by the State's legislators because the object: 
of the statute-convience-was not a rational basis for the clas 
fication and even if it was, it could not outweigh an individc: 
constitutional rights. In this regard, it said: 
No doubt the absolute monarchs of the past, 
and the dictators of today, refused and still refuse 
to be charged with wrong, but that is no reason why 
our representative and democratic forms of government . 
should be so classified. We think the rule was adopted 
in this country as a convenience to a sovereign people. 
-6-
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We do not subscribe to the belief that con-
v~n~ence is a pervasive legislative objective suf-
flclent to totally deprive the appellants access 
to the courts. Convenience is completely unaccept-
able as a standard by which to balance the rights 
of the state. Convenience should not outweigh an 
individual's right to be compensated for actual 
damages sustained and injuries suffered. To hold 
conv~n~ence is.a permissible legislative objective, 
sufflclent to lnsulate the government from negli-
gence, is to engage in incredulous reasoning, void 
of logic, which undermines the very principles upon 
which this nation was founded. Brown at 82,82. 
(Citations omitted) 
In Kansas one injured by governmental entity was clas-
sified solely by the type of governmental entity involved. 
Their right to redress and remedies available, if any, were 
dependent solely upon this classification. Similar inequities 
are involved in the present case. 
Legislative history and judicial opinion provide ample 
evidence that the purpose behind the statutory section in 
question here was to prevent prisoners from continually har-
rassing official personnel with lawsuits and to prevent actions 
against the State for injuries inflicted by one inmate upon 
another. Senate Journal of 1965, pp. 136-37; Shefield v. 
Turner, 21 Utah 2nd 314, 445 P. 2nd 367 (1968). 
In application, the section in question allows a cause 
of action according to which class the prisoner falls in. If 
he is a prisoner who receives treatment within the prison hos-
pital, then a cause of action for any injuries sustained as a 
result of that treatment is denied. If he is a prisoner who 
has received injuries as a result of treatment at another 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hospital facility, his cause of action is preserved. Under 
close analyzation of the purposes of Section 63-30-10(10), ~ 
is Appellants' contention that there is no reasonable relatior 
between such purposes and the classification which is i!Tlposed 
by the application of the Act. As such, the statute in ques-
tion, Section 63-30-10 (10), Utah Code Annotated, is in viola-
tion of the Constitution of the United States and the Canst~ 
tution of the State of Utah and is, therefore, unconstituti~ 
Being unconstitutional, the lower Court erred in applying it 
to the present case. 
B. PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THAT AN ENTITY BE RESPONSIBL: 
FOR ITS NEGLIGENT ACTS. THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT I! 
CONTRARY TO SUCH POLICY AND SHOULD BE TOTALLY ABROGATED. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act had its genesis in 
the English Common Law Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. Many 
courts have stated that sovereign immunity was founded on the 
proposition that the "king could do no wrong." In reality, 
however, it was not that the king could do no wrong, he was 
just privileged to do wrong and not be held accountable for 
it in his own courts. In Driggs v. Utah State Teacher Retire· 
ment Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P. 2d 657 (1943) the Utah Supre' 
Court, in an opinion by then District Judge Crockett criticiz' 
this foundation of sovereign immunity: 
The idea that the King could do no wrong 
was merely a fictional concept without any right-
eous basis in law or logic. It arose out of the 
desire of the king and those holding favored pos-
itions under him to impose their will upon those 
~s-
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who were less privileged. This antiquated idea has 
certainly never had any place in American jurispru-
dence. 
The more rational approach to the notion of 
sovereign immunity was indicated by Blackstone, 1 
Bl. Comm: 2 41, 2 4 2: "The law ascribed to the king 
the attr1bute of sovereignity. He is a sovereign 
and independent within his own dominions, and he 
owes no kind of subjection to any other kind of 
potentate upon earth. Hence, it is that no suit or 
action can be brought against the king, even in 
civil matters, because no court can have jurisdic-
tion over him; for all jurisdiction implies super-
iority of power. 
It was thought an anomaly that the king should 
have jurisdiction over himself, and that he could be 
asked to make himself do something. In our govern-
ment of three separate branches, this paradox does 
not exist. There is no reason why the judiciary in 
its proper function as an independent branch of the 
government should not be asked to adjudicate the 
rights of individuals against the other branches 
of the government, or even as against the judiciary 
itself. Driggs at 658. 
Sovereign immunity was imported to America by the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court in Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 
9 Mass. 247 (1912). That court held that even though the town 
was incorporated, had a treasury out of which a judgment could 
be satisfied and had a means of taxation which could replenish 
the town's treasury; the town was immune from suit for its 
tortious wrongs, wrongfully citing the old English case, Russel 
v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 362, 2 T.R. 673 (1788) for sup-
port. The Russel case involved a suit against all the inhabi-
tants of a country for damages occurring to Russel's wagon 
by reason of a bridge being out of repair. The Court disallowed 
-9-
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the action primarily on the yrounds that there 1vas no fund 
out of which any judyment could be paid ~nd ''it is better 
that an individual should sustain an injury than that the 
public should suffer an inconvenience". Russel at 3G3. 
said: 
Commenting on this case the Minnesota Supreme Court 
There is no mention of "the king can oo no 
wrong", but on the contrary it is suggested that 
the Plaintiff sue the county itself rather than 
the individual inhabitants. Every reason assiyned 
by the Court is born out of expediency. The wrong 
to Plaintiff is submerged in the convience of the 
public. No moral, ethical, or rational reason 
for the decision is advanced by the Court except 
the practical problem of assessing damages against 
individual defendants ... " It was on this shaky 
foundation that the law of governmental tort im-
munity was erected in Minnesota and elsewhere. 
Spanel v. Mounds View School District No. 621, 
264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W. 2d 795, 197 (1962). 
Some courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, have 
justified governmental immunity on these same grounds; see 
Hurst v. Highway Department, 16 Utah 2d 153, 397 P.2d 71 
(1964). However, the statistical data simply does not 
support this fear that governmental functions would be cur-
tailed by allowing citizens to sue their government. 
as early as 1959, it was apparent that this was not a 
rational basis for governmental immunity. 
Figures actually compiled showing the 
claims experience in typical cities show that 
Even 
the spectre of the crippling judgment, as a 
deterrent to abrogation of procedural or sub-
stantive immunities, so far as not materialized 
in any great degree. The force of the "crippling 
judgment" may be vitiated by se]f insurance or 
commercial insurance. So far as knovm, 
municipal insolvency proceedings in the federal 
courts have not occurred because of tort judgments. 
--l 0-
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David, "Tort Liability of Local Government: 
Alternatives to Immunity from Suit or Liability," 
6 u.c.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1959) . 
. These original purposes of sovereign immunity; to 
protect the feudal lord from suit in his own court, to pro-
tect local government from the numerous feared suits, and 
to protect the state from feared insolvency, are contrary 
to one of the most fundamental principles of civilized 
society: that if a person or his property is wrongfully 
injured he should be able to seek reasonable compensation 
and relief from the wrongdoer. It is because the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity is contrary to this fundamental princi-
ple that the governmental proprietary distinction developed. 
This principle is designed to mitigate the harsh effects of 
sovereign immunity and allow relief in certain cases. However, 
the difficulty is in applying the distinction. Usually, the 
results are inconsistent and illogical, often arbitrary and 
harsh, as exception after exception developed to the rule 
that government could not be sued in governmental matters. 
Utah is no exception to this trend; history is replete with 
the Utah Court making fine distrinctions which do not promote 
justice or the purpose of governmental immunity. 
The Utah Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine 
in Gillmore v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180, 89P. 714 (1907). 
That case involved an action for trespass to Plaintiff's 
property while police officers were searching the Jordan 
River for a dead body. In ruling against the Plaintiff the 
Court said, "It seems manifest that the city in any event, was 
-11-
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engaged in the discharge of a public duty as agent of the 
sovereign state, its creator, 
. the City, in the absence 
of a special statute, cannot be held responsible for the 
acts of police officers, and certainly not strangers." 
A year later the court recognized an exception to 
Gillmore. The Court held that a city, maintaining a water 
works system supplying water to its residents, acts in a 
proprietary capacity and is liable for any acts committed while 
supplying the water to the same extent as any private owner 
would be. Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P.570 
(1908). 
From Brown and Gillmor to the present time, the 
Court has struggled with governmental immunity and its ex-
ceptions. The Court has held there is immunity in cases 
concerning: flood waters from a state constructed reservoir 
and canal1 , operation of a fire truck on city streets, 2 
injuries resulting from burns received from a school incin-
3 
erator , injuries from burns received in a community recrea-
4 5 tion area , operation of a municipal golf course , an air-
6 7 port waiting room , sewer , operation of a state owned gravel 
~l'lilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913) · 
3Rollow v. Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P.791 (1926). Blngham v. Board of Education of Ogden, 118 Utah 
582, 223 4P.2d 432 (1950). Ramierez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d 
463, (19')5). 
5Jopes v. Salt Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 297, 343 p.2d 
728 (1956). 
Wade v. Salt Lake City, 10 Utah 2d 374, 353 P.2d 
914 (1960). 
7cobiar v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986 
(1961). 
-12-
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pit 8 , and maintenance of a sewage disposal system9 
During the same period that Court held there is no 
immunity in cases concerning: injuries resulting from the 
maintenance of public streets10 ; the maintenance of a public 
nuisance11 the maintenance of an attractive nuisance12 , 
t ·o fbthh d · · 1 13 ·· opera 1 n o a ouses an sw1mm1ng poo s , mun1c1pal water 
works 14 , and flooding from a municipal reservoir15 
This brief look at the history of governmental im-
munity shows the arbitrariness involved in its application. 
The decisions do not seem to further the purpose of the 
doctrine; they tend only to show its lack of rationality. 
There seems to be no reasonable relationship between the 
particular classification and the supposed purpose of 
sovereign immunity. What discernable difference can there 
be between the operation of municipal golf course and a 
municipally operated swimming pool? Yet, the Court has held 
16 that immunity exists for the golf course , but not for the 
. . . 17 
sw1mm1ng pool operat1on Clearly the distinction operates 
8Hurst v. Highway Department, 16 Utah 2d 153, 397 
P.2d 71 F964). 
Johnson v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitation 
District6 20 Utah 2d 389, 438 P.2d 706 (1968). Rollow v. Ogden City, Note 2. 
llRollow, Note 2. 12Brawn-v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570 
(1908). 3 
1 Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 P.444 
(1926) "14 
Brown, Note 12. 
15Ne5tffian v. south Davis county Water Improvement Dis-
~rict, 16 Utah 2d 198, 398 P.2d 203 (1965}. 
16Jopes, Note 5, supra. 
1 7BUrEOn, Note 13, supra. 
-1.3-
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unequally as to people in similar circumstances. 
In 1965, the Utah Legislature adopted the Govern-
mental Immunity Act. The act had two main purposes. In some 
areas it maintained the arbitrary governmental proprietary 
distinction based on the groundless fear that government still 
needed to be protected. In other areas its express purpose 
was to restrict or even waive immunity altogether. Utah 
chose to act legislatively against this anachronistic 
doctrine while other states have been in the process of 
judicially changing this harsh rule of the 18th Century. 
Almost a majority of states have now abolished or severly 
restricted the doctrine of governmental immunity. See, e.g., 
Brown v. 1'/ichita State University, supra. Nieting v. Blondell, 
235 N.W.3d 597 (Minn. 1975); Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E. 
2d 832 (W.Va. 1975); Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public 
Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A. 2d 877 (1973); Spencer v. General 
Hospital of District of Columbia, 138 U.S App. D.C. 48, 425 
F.2d 479 (1969); Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. 1972); 
Flournoy v. School Dist. No. 1, 174 Colo. 110, 482, P.2d 966 
(1971); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970); 
Willis v. Department of Conservation and Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 
534, A.2d 34 (1970); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261 
A.2d 896 (1970); General Laws of Rhode Island §9-31-1; ~ 
v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968); ~~ 
v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Beac:_h_v__._~ 
of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967); Haney v. city 
of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Sherbutt'=-v. _ __Marin~ 
-14-
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~ity, 374 Mich. 48, 130 N.W.2d 920 (1964); Rice v. Clark 
county, 79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963); Scheele v. City of 
~chorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963); Muskopf v. Corning 
Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal~ Rrtr. 80, 359 P.2d 
457 (1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 
l~· 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Hargrove v. Town of 
Cocoa Beach, 96 S.2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 
588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975); Wolfe v. Town of Bradford, 22 Conn. 
Sup. 239, 167 A.2d 924 (1961); Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 
247 La. 784, 174 So.2d 529 (1965); Tennessee Department of 
Mental Health v. Hughes, 531 S.\1.2d 299 (Tenn. 1975); State 
Highway Department v. Pinder, 531 S.W. 2d 857 (Texas 1975); 
Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 407 P.2d 
440 (Wash. 1965); Iowa Code Annotated, Section 25A-l et seq.; 
Noll v. City of Bozeman, 534 P.2d 880 (Mont. 1975); Oregon 
Revised Statutes, Section 30.265-285; New York Consolidated 
Statutes, Section l0b-6(b); Rodriguez v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 
472 P.2d 509 (1970), Hawaii Revised Statutes, Section 662-2, 
15 (1). 
Court opinions and legal writings demonstrate that 
there are no reasonable justifications for the continuation of 
this doctrine which imposes such severe hardship and economic 
loss on the citizens of this State. 
Utah's neighboring states have abolished the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court of Arizona has said, 
-15-
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"We are of the opinion that when the rc•.-1,oon 
for a certain rule no longer exists, the rule it-
self should be aban~oned. After a thorough rc-
examination_of_t~e rule of governmental immunity 
from tort llablllty, we now hold that it must be 
discarded as a rule of law in Arizona and all prior 
decisions to the contrary are hereby overruled." 
-?_tone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 
3 eT;- 3 s1 P. 2 a Tif7~--rcf9---n. %-3l .- -
The Idaho Supreme Court in severely restricting 
sovereign immunity in that state has said, "It is unguestion· 
able that lhere is an established trend discrediting the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity." -?_m~_th _ _'1_.__5_!:ate, 93 Tdaho 
795, 473 P.2d 937, 943 (1970). 
Justice Traynor, in a landmark California decision, 
had this to say concerning the governmental immunity: 
After a re-evaluation of the governmental 
immunity from tort liability we have concluded 
that it must be discarded as mistaken and unjust. 
The rule of governmental immunity for tort is an 
anachronism, without rational basis, and has 
existed only by the force of inertia. . None 
of the reasons for its continuance can withstand 
analysis. No one defends total governmental 
immunity. In fact, it docs not exist. It has 
become riddled with exceptions, both legislative 
and judicial. . and the exceptions operate so 
illogically as to cause serious inequality. Some 
who are injured by governmental agencies can recover, 
others cannot: one injured while attending a com-
munity theater in a public park may recover. 
but one injured in a children's playground may not. 
for torts committed in the course of a governmental 
function" there is no liability, unless the tort 
be classified as a nuisance. Muskopf v. Corning 
Hospital District, 359 P. 2d 4 57-( 196-iT.--( c-fta-tTons 
ommitted). ---
In a very strongly worded opinion, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court responded to its first opportunity to discard 
-16-
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the anachronistic doctrine. 
"Several times in the recent past this 
court has cast aspe~sions upon sovereign immunity. 
but unfortunately, ln those cases, the issue was 
not squarely before us as it is today. Thus, 
we take this opportunity to rid the State of this 
legal anachronism. Common law sovereign immunity 
may no longer be interposed as a defense by the 
State, or any of its political subdivisions, in 
tort actions ... It can no longer be justified 
by existing circumstances and has long been devoid 
of any valld Justification. 
We recognize that this is a far-reaching 
decision which, at first blush, does violence to 
the doctrine of stare decisis. However, we do 
not feel that stare decisis should be used to per-
petuate the harsh and unjust results which blind 
adherence to sovereign immunity rules mandated." 
Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Court also rejected the rational of Russell v. 
Men of Devon, supra, as "an anachronism in the law of today. " 
Id. at 1156. 
On the basis of the aforementioned authority, Ap-
pellants conclude that the ancient doctrine of sovereign im-
munity has lost its underpinnings by the social and govern-
mental change which have occurred. In today's world, we cannot 
discount the extent of governmental intervention and actions 
which affect the conduct of human affairs. This view was 
expressed with great clarity by Justice Cardozo in the follow-
ing words: 
"A rule which in its origins was the creation 
of the courts themselves, and was supposed in the 
making to express the mores of the day, may be ab-
rogated by the courst when the mores have so changed 
that perpetuation of the rule would do violence to 
the social conscience." Cardozo, The Growth of the 
Law, pp. 136-37 (1924). 
-17-
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Tort liability is grounded in lhe concept that an 
individual, or any entity, should he rcsuonsible for injuries 
occasioned by his/her/its negligent acts. While valid pur-
poses may have once existed for the creation of the doctrine 
of governmental immunity, the reasons for the adoption of the 
doctrine have long since disappeared. Appellants agn~e with 
the view suggested by Justice Cardozo, that when the reason 
for a judicially-created rule disappears, the Court is not 
only empowered to abrogate the rule, but has a duty to do so. 
Appellants urge the Court to follow the trend established by 
Utah's neighboring states and return the state of the law in 
Utah to that which is promulgated by the public policy sur-
rounding the very concept of liability in tort. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS' CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ARISE OUT OF 
INCARCERATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
63-30-10 (10) 
Section 63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated provides that 
immunity from suit for all governmental entities is waived 
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omissioo 
of an employee committed within the scope of his employment. 
If this provisions were to go no further, there could be no 
serious contention that governmental immunity has not been 
waived with respect to the case at bar. However, Section 
63-30-10 goes on to provide a series of exceptions to the 
waiver of immunity, and it specifically provides for an 
-18-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
exception from the waiver if the injury arises out of the in-
carceration of any person in any State prison or other place 
of "legal confinement." It is conceded by Appellants that 
Appellants' decedent was legally confined in a State Prison at 
the time of his death. The issue then becomes whether or not 
the injury to Appellants' decedent, which ultimately caused 
his death, did in fact "arise out of his incarceration." 
Respondents contend that any injury arising from any 
function associated with operation of a prison must be construed 
as arising from the incarceration. Appellants assert, however, 
that if the broad interpretation insisted upon by the defendant 
is given the statute, there could never be any waiver of im-
munity on the part of the State for any injury which was con-
nected in any way with a prisoner or prison. Surely the legis-
lature intended to waive immunity in some instances and did 
not intend that this subsection be interpreted so broadly so 
as to eliminate that very waiver. Such construction would 
seem to limit a cause of action against the prison to a visitor 
who was injured by the accidental discharge of a guard's 
weapon, simply because he was visiting a person who was "in-
carcerated" within the meaning of the statute. 
Judicial construction of Section 63-30-10(10) Utah Code 
Annotated is limited at best. In 1968, the Utah Supreme Court 
decided· the case of Sheffield v. Turner, supra, in which the 
Plaintiff Sheffield, who had been an inmate at the Utah State 
-1.9-
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Prison, sued the State of Utah and the prison warden for 
damages resulting from an alte~cation between the Plaintiff 
and another prisoner in which the Plaintiff was stabbed in 
his eye. In that case, the District Court granted the 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss based on Section 63-30-10(10) 
holding that plaintiff's injury arose out of his incarcerati~ 
at a state prison. On appeal, the Plaintiff contested the 
dismissal only as to the prison warden, but the Utah Supreme 
Court commented on the dismissal as to the State of Utah as 
follows: 
"Inasmuch as the statute just referred to 
(63-30-10(10) plainly retains sovereign immunity 
to the State for any injury arising out of incar-
ceration in the prison, the trial court correctly 
dismissed the complaint as to it." 
The Sheffield case, however, is not as helpful as 
it may seem because it is clearly distinguishable from the 
facts of the case at bar. In Sheffield, the plaintiff was, 
as mentioned, injured by a fellow prisoner. In this case, 
Appellants' decedant, Thomas Madsen, was not injured by a 
fellow prisoner nor was his injury caused by any other 
activity closely associated with the operation of a prison, 
but his injury was caused by the negligent operation of a 
hospital facility and by the negligent hospital personnel. 
Another Utah case dealing with Section 63-30-10(10) 
Utah Code Annotated is that of Emery __ ':'_-_State, 26 U.2d l, 
483 P.2d 1296, (1971). In the Emery case, the issue decided 
by the Utah Supreme Court was whether or not a State Hospita~ 
qualified as another place of legal confinement. The ic;sue 
-20-
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of what constitutes an injury arising out of incarceration 
was not raised, therefore, the Emery case is not helpful 
to us on that issue. 
It is an accepted principal of law in Utah that where 
a particular statutory phrase has been used in the past by the 
State Legislature and has been construed in the past by the 
Courts, it is to be assumed that the legislature is aware of 
the judicial construction of that phrase and that when that 
language is used by future legislatures it is used advisedly. 
See Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 533 P.2d 799 at 801, (1975). 
With that principal in mind, Plaintiffs direct the Court's 
attention to Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated providing 
that workman's compensation is available to employees who are 
killed or injured by accidents "arising out of" or in the 
course of their employment. Under the workman's compensation 
statute, the phrase "arising out of" has been construed in a 
number of cases to require a close causal connection between 
the employee's employment and the injury he suffers. The 
case of Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 72 
L.Ed. 507, 48 S.Ct. 221, 66 ALR 1402, (1928), affirming 68 
U. 600, 251 P. 555, is particularly illustrative. In that 
case the Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
phrase arising out of as contained in the Utah statute meant 
that liability would be imposed if there were a close causal 
connection between the injury and the employment in which the 
employee was then engaged and which substantially contributed 
-2J-
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to the injury. It appears well established in Utah that 
before a causal connection can be established under the 
phrase arising out of, it must be shown that the injury 
resulted from a risk to which the injured person was sub-
jected by his employment. See Andreason et al v. Industrial 
Commission et al, 98 Utah 551, 100 P.2d 202, (1940). 
In the lower court, the respondents relied 
heavily upon Justice Crockett's language in Eptin9~ 
State, 546 P.2d 242 (1976), for the alleged premise that 
where a prisoner is still under control of prison authoritie 
incidents thereto "arise out of the incarceration." Res-
pondents' reliance would seem to be mis-placed in that 
Justice Crockett was speaking as to whether inmate Hart's 
conduct arose out of the incarceration. The language of 
the statute requires that the injury result from the incarce· 
ation. There is no requirement of a causal link between the 
conduct of the agent committing the negligent act and the 
incarceration, but between the injury and the incarceration. 
The Utah Courts have always applied the close causal con-
nection definition of this phrase rather strictly requiring 
more to be shown that simply that the injury occured "in 
the course of" the employment. See M & K Corporation v. 
Industrial Commission, 112 U. 488, 189 P. 2d 132, (1948) · 
According to the principal of law above enunciated, 
this Court must assume that the Utah Legislature knew the 
construction which has been applied to the phrase arising 
-22-
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out of and used it advisedly when it was included in 
Section 63-30-10(10) Utah Code Annotated. As applied to 
the facts of this case, the phrase arising out of the 
incarceration of a person would refer to an injury which is 
in some way caused by one's incarceration or an injury 
resulting from a risk to which a person is exposed by 
reason of incarceration. There is no such close causal 
connection between the fact of incarceration and negligent 
actions of medical personnel. To say that incarceration 
exposes one to the risk which caused the death of Plaintiffs' 
decedent in this case is to say that substandard medical 
attention and treatment are knowingly and intentionally 
provided by the State of Utah to prisoners in the State Prison 
and that such is to be expected and accepted as a consequence 
of incarceration. 
The cause of the injury in this case is not closely 
connected with incarceration, but could have taken place 
in any medical facility given the same type of negligent 
acts complained of in Appellants' Complaint. Even if a 
causal connection is found, it cannot be seriously argued 
that the decedent's incarceration contributed substantially 
to his injury. 
POINT III 
THE INJURY TO APPELLANTS' DECEDENT IS NOT WITHIN THE 
CONTEMPLATION OF EXCEP'riON 10 TO SECTION 63-30-10 AND THE 
COURT ERRED IN SO APPLYING THE STATUTE. 
-23-
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An examination of the legislative history of Utah 
Code Annotated, §63-30-10 (10), (the section preserving im-
munity if the injury arises out of the incarceration of any 
person) shows that the Legislature of the State of Utah, 
in enacting the Governmental Immunity Act, never intended 
that subsection (10) apply to a situation like the present 
one. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was introduced 
in the Utah Legislature in 1965 as Senate Bill No. 4. The 
bill was sponsored by Charles Welch, Jr. and M. Jenkins 
(Senate Journal 1965 hereinafter referred to as "S.J. "). ThE 
appellants request the Court to take judicial notice of the 
Senante Journal for 1965. (U.C.A. 78-25-l). Senate Bill No. 
4 was introduced and read to the Senate on the lst day of 
the session, January ll, 19 65, and was referred to the Rules 
Committee for further consideration. (S.J. p.32). On the 
second day of the session, it was printed and referred to 
the Judiciary Committee. (S.J. p.38) The bill then went 
through various readings and committees until it was placed 
on the calendar for second reading of the bill on the lOth 
day of the session, January 20, 1965. (S.J. p. 136-137). 
On that day, the Senate added several amendmCJnts to the orio. 
bill. One of those amendments was subsection (10) concerni~ 
the incarceration of persons in state prisons, etc. FollovW 
is the summary of those proceedings as printed in the Senate 
-24-
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Journal of 1965, pp. 136-137: 
.on m~tion o~ ~enator Welch S.B. No. 4 having 
reta1ned 1ts pos1t1on on the Second Reading 
Calendar, was now before the Senate. 
On Motion of Senator Welch S.B. No. 4 was 
amended as follows: 
Page 3, Add subsection (10) to Section 10, 
reading, "arises out of the incarceration of any 
person 1n any state prison, county or city Jall 
or other place of legal confinement, or." 
(emphas1s added) 
An examination of actual recordings of the con-
versations that took place of the floor of the Senate 
during the adoption of the amendments to S.B. 4 provide the 
listener with an insight into the actual discussion of the 
Senate when adopting that amendment. 
The discussion relating to the adoption of sub-
section (10) began by Senator Welch reading the proposed 
subsection (10). Senator Welch read the section very slowly 
because the Senators had not been provided with copies of 
the amendment previously. After reading the proposed amend-
ment very slowly, Senator Welch then quickly read the entire 
amendment again. Then he explained the purpose of the 
amendment. A transcription of the discussion is as follows: 
SENATOR WELCH: 
"You can write it at the bottom of the page 
if you want, and these are the words (read very 
slowly) 'arises out of the incarceration of any 
person in any state prison, county or city jail 
or other place of legal confinement, or.' Now 
let me repeat that please. You will see that it 
follows pretty well the language that is already 
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Senate. 
on your printed amendments except just at the 
beginning there are two or three extra words 
in there, Mr. President." (1-Jords in parenthesis 
are editorial comments). 
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: 
"Would you repeat that paragraph Senator 
Welch?" 
SENATOR WELCH: 
"I will, and if you will follow the language 
in the printed ones you will see that I have just 
added, we have just added two or three words here 
to make it kind of follow the same language we 
have had in respect to the other subsection. 
(Whereupon Mr. Welch repeated the propsed sub-
section (10). 
Now I can explain this very briefly, there 
was the concern of some of our officials who have 
to do with the state prison and other institutions, 
unless we had this limitation in there they might 
be beseiged with suits and that sort of thing of 
persons who claim that~-ey~re-rni51:D2ated and 
that sort of thing." (emphasis added). 
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: 
"Mr. President, I understand then on our page 
2 amendment that we drop the balance of that, "shall 
have a cause of action under the statute", is that 
correct?" 
SENATOR WELCH: 
"Yes." 
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE: 
"What he is doing is substituting the language 
that he just dictated for the language that you have 
on the amendment sheet." (Recording of Senate Pro-
ceedings, Day 10, Jan. 20th, 1965, Part III, Side L 
located in Lieutenant Governor's Office.) 
The proposed amendments were voted upon and passed by the 
The bill was then sent to the House where it was voted u~ 
-26-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on the 32nd day of session. S.B. No. 4, as amended by the 
Senate, failed to pass the House on that day. The following 
day, S.B. No. 4 passed the House after being amended. The 
amendments, however, did not involve subsection (10) of 
section 10. The bill then returned to the Senate where it 
passed the Senate and was eventually signed into law by the 
Governor. The only discussion of the language in question 
was a statement that the provision was added for the benefit 
of prison officals and others who were afraid they would 
be sued by "persons who claim they were mistreated." 
Judicial interpretation has resulted in a similar 
construction. In Sheffield v. ~urner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 
445 P.2d 367 (1968), the Cqurt said: 
"There can be no question but that the maintenance 
of a state prison and the keeping of prisoners 
therein is a necessary auxiliary of government 
and therefore, a governmental function, nor 
that consequently the performance of the duties 
incident thereto would normally be protected by 
the traditional rule of sovereign immunity. In 
this connection it is appropriate to point out 
that this does not constitute a carte blanche 
protection for anythlng that may be done or per-
mltted in a prlson. 
On the other side of this proposition is the 
imperative need for those in a supervisory capacity 
to have reasonable freedom to discharge the 
burdensome responsibilities of keeping in con-
finement and maintaining discipline of a large 
number of men who have been convicted of serious 
crime. If such officials are too vulnerable to 
lawsuits for anythlng untoward which may happen 
to inmates a number of evils follow ..• " 
(Emphasis added). 
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As can be seen from the Court's analysis, the 
basis purposes of immunity from injuries arising out of 
incarceration are 1) to prevent prisoners from continually 
harrassing official personnel with lawsuits; 2) to prevent 
actions against the state for injuries inflicted by one 
inmate upon another. 
The injury to Thomas Madsen cannot, by any reason~~ 
construction, be found to lie within either of these areas. 
Death resulting from improper treatment and care is in no 
respect similar to a suit against the prison because the 
inmate's cell is too cold. Nor is the injury one which has 
been inflicted by a fellow prisoner. The injury to the 
deceased in this instance was inflicted by the act or o-
mission of those whose assignment it was to look after him. 
Since the injury to Thomas Madsen is not one which 
falls within legislative contemplation or judicial construct 
of the purposes behind exception 10 to Section 63-30-10, 
Appellants contend that the exception is inapplicable in the 
present case and the State is barred from denying the statut 
waiver of immunity. 
POINT IV 
PRE-OPERATIVE AND POST-OPERATIVE TREATMENT OF THE 
DECEASED WAS AN OPERATIONAL FUNCTION WHICH IS NOT WITHIN 
THE COVER~GE OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 63-30-10(1). 
Section 63-30-10(1) provides that: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental en-
tities is waived forinjury proximately caused by 
a negligent act or omission of an employee 
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committed within the scope of his employment 
except if the injury: 
(1) arises out of the exercise or perform-
ance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function. 
Absent the exception, the government has waived 
its immunity from suit in actions such as the one at bar. 
The issue then becomes whether the actions of the prison 
officials and employees prior to, during, and after the 
operation upon Thomas Madsen were of such a nature as to 
be categorized as discretionary, and therefore, impose no 
liability upon the State. Respondents urge, citing Dalehite 
~~, 346 u.s. 15, 73 s.ct. 956 (1953), that the negli-
gent acts of the prison employees and officials were pursuant 
to the basic plan which established the prison hospital, 
and as such were protected by the holding of that case. 
The Dalehite opinion, however, recognizes the 
existence of a distinction between discretionary and oper-
ational activities as they pertai~ to the action taken by 
governmental employees. If we were to assume the position 
urged by respondents, we would be hard put to find an 
activity which could be classified as operational in nature. 
Any action taken is somewhat objective in origin and requires 
some degree of discretion. This court held in the case of 
~ar~oll v. State Road Commission, 27 U.2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 
(1972) as follows: 
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. cvPry action of a government employee, 
except a cond1t1oned reflex action, involved the 
use of some degree of discretion. The Court 
observed that acts done in accordance with opera-
tiona] level decisions do not come within the 
discretionary function exception. The Court 
stated that the conclusion may be drawn that oper-
ational level acts are those which confirm routine 
everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of ' 
broad policy factors. 
* * * 
. Consequently, the circuit court did 
not error in holding that the state's negligence 
in this case did not come within the discretionary 
function exception." Carrol_l_'.T_-__~t_ate__J'(_?ad Comrnis-
~"!:_~n_ ib. at page 388, 399~--
While appellants can see that the decision to 
construct a prison hospital, and possibly even the decision 
to allow Thomas ~adsen to undergo the operation may be dis-
cretionary actions, the treatment involved with the ope ratio: 
was operational. Certainly, in any medical facility, a 
standard rule of good medical care must exist, and such 
can always be measured objectively. While the decision as 
to the quantity and/or type of two acceptable anesthetics 
may be a subjective choic~, the decision to give a morphine 
injection to a patient know to be suffering from a heart 
condition is a knowing negligent act by any objective standar 
To argue that the injury to Thomas t1adsen arose out 
of a discretionary act is to say that it is a matter of 
discretion in the prison administration whether or not to 
provide decent and adequate medical care to the prisoners 
incarcerated therein. Specifically, it is to say that it is 
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discretionary in the individual doctor or technician whether 
or not to provide adequate medical care for individual 
patient. Obviously, this is not what was intended by the 
legislature in an acting section 63-30-10(1) Utah Code 
Annotated. Clearly, a responsibility of a technician or 
an orderly to make rounds and see that the patient's needs 
constitute an operational function. Also, the maintenance 
of an oxygen unit to keep it in good working condition is 
certainly an operational function. Without a doubt, the 
duty of an employee of a medical facility to check on a 
patient who has had surgery that day after being informed 
by someone else that that patient is having difficulty 
breathing must be an operational function. Therefore, the 
injury to appellant's decedent Thomas Madsen did not arise 
out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise 
or perform a discretionary function and this action is therefore, 
not barred by that provision. 
POINT V 
OPERATION OF A HOSPITAL FACILITY AT THE STATE PRISON 
IS A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION \'ffiiCH IS NOT WITHIN THE COVERAGE 
OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Surely there is no question that operation of a 
prison facility by the State Government is a governmental 
function. Operation of a hospital facility, however, is 
another matter. In the case of Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 
533 P.2d 799, (1975), the Utah Supreme Court held that opera-
tion of a hospital facility by a municipality is a proprietary 
~31-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
function and is not within the coverage of the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act. In the Greenhalgh case, the Court out-
lined four important factors to consider in deciding whether 
an activity is proprietary or governmental. Those factors 
are: 1) Whether the activity is something which is done for 
the general public good. 2) Whether there is any special 
pecuniary benefit to the municipality and, 4) Whether it is 
of such a nature as to be in competition with free enterpri~ 
One noticable difference between the Greenhalgh case and thio 
case is that a municipal hospital accepts patients in return 
for payment while the State provides medical services for ito 
prisoners. However, that is not entirely true since a public 
hospital also accepts a large number of welfare patients and 
medicare patients whose medical services are also provided~ 
the government. 
The important issue on this point is whether or not 
maintenance of a hospital facility at which surgery may be 
performed, etc. on the State Prison premises is to be regard; 
as a public responsibility. Apart from a routine pill dis-
pensory and first aid clinic, there is absolutely no necessi: 
or responsibility on the part of the State to operate a 
hospital facility at the State Prison. Even with the presec 
hospital facilities, prisoners are frequently sent to the 
University Medical Center and other privately and independar 
maintained hospitals for various medical services. Had Ap-
pellants' decedent hroen permitted to have his surgery perfo' 
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3t one of those hospitals, there would not be a question of 
governmental immunity with regard to a claim of negligence 
connected therewith. Therefore, since the State of utah 
has chosen to maintain a complete hospital facility on the 
Prison premises for its own convenience, maintenance of that 
facility must be regarded as a proprietary function just as 
if a similar facility were maintained and opened to the 
public. Another consideration was raised in the Greenhalgh 
case, as well as in the case of Sessions v Thomas D. Dee 
~1emorial Hospital, 94 U. 460, 78 P.2d 645, (1938), which is 
the paramount public policy of encouraging a high standard of 
case in a medical or hospital facility. That principal should 
be applied here in that if immunity is to be granted for any 
and all acts of negligence which may occur in the hospital 
facility on the part of doctors, nurses or technicians, there 
is no way to encourage those who operate the facility to 
exercise due care. It is therefore, a matter of public 
lc policy not to extend the principal of governmental irrununity 
to the hospital facility. 
t POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS 
AS TO DEFENDANTS SAMUEL H. SMITH, LEON HATCH, TAGE SPONBECK 
,n' AND DOE I THROUGH DOE V. 
The lower Court found that the individual Defendants, 
dS well as the State and the Board of Corrections, were pro-
tected by the Section 63-30-10(10), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
0' 
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Therefore, the motion to dismiss as to the individual De-
fendants was also granted. 
That motion, however, should only be granted where 
there is no viable premise upon which the Plaintiff could 
recover. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure #l2(b). In the 
case at bar, the requisite premise or theory still exists. 
In Sheffield v. Turner, Supra. In another case dealing witl 
the meaning of "arising out of the incarceration", the Court 
held: 
. (T)he warden and other prison officers 
are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
against claims of negligence so long as they are 
acting in good faith and within the scope of their 
duties, and that they could not be held liable un-
less they were guilty of some conduct which trans-
cended the bounds of good faith performance of the~ 
duty by a wilful or malicious wrongful act which 
they know or should know would result in injury." 
(Emphasls added) . 
Appellant's pleadings in the lower court contained 
allegations sufficient to create a triable issue of fact ~ 
to whether the actions of the individual defendants, while 
possessed with knowledge regarding the seriousness of deceao 
Thomas Madsen's physical condition both prior to and followi 
the operation, were such as would constitute a wilful or 
malicious wrongful act which they knew or should have known 
would result in serious complications and probable injury. 
If that issue were found in appellant's favor, then the jur 
would have been forced to find for the Appellants and again' 
the individual respondents. 
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Therefore, the granting of the dismissal as to the 
individual Defendants without adjudication upon the merits 
of such claim constitutes reversible error. 
A finding that the State is immune to suit in a case 
such as this does not automatically require a dismissal as 
to the individual Defendants. Utah Code Annotated, Section 
63-30-20 bars any action against the employee whose act 
or ommission gave rise to the claim if judgment is rendered 
against the State upon such claim. That language offers no 
connotation that if the State is held not to be liable,that 
the claim against the employee is also dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, appellants submit that the trial court 
erred in granting respondents' motion to dismiss on the basis 
of governmental immunity. Appellants' contend that Section 
63-30-10(10), Utah Code Annotated is unconstitutional in 
that it denies equal protection of the law. Appellants also 
contend that the death of Thomas Madsen was not an injury 
"arising out of the incarceration" of the prisoner, Thomas 
Madsen, rendering Section 63-30-10(10) inapplicable to this 
case. Appellants further contend that even if the statute 
is found to be applicable, that such injury is not of the 
type which the legislature of the State of Utah contemplated 
as falling within the auspices of the statute when it was 
enacted. Finally, appellants assert that the negligent acts 
of the respondents were of an operational, rather than a 
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discretionary nature, and are, therefore, not controlled by 
Section 63-30-10(1), Utah Code Annotated. Even if the Court 
finds that Appellants' claim against the State is barred by 
the Governmental Immunity Act, the case should be remanded 
to consider the liability which may still extend to the 
individual respondents. 
Appellants respectfully urge that the judgment of 
dismissal by Third District Court be reversed and that this 
case be remanded to the trial court for disposition on the 
merits of the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
AJ.~?Jl~ 
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN, 
Attorney for Appellants 
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